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An the past decade, higher levels of
schooling have become more financially
rewarding. Adjusted for inflation, the
earnings of college-educated workers
rose during the 1980s, while they de-
clined for employees with a high-school
diploma or less. This development stands
in marked contrast to the 1970s, when
college-educated workers actually lost
ground relative to those with only a high-
school degree.
The bipartisan support accorded to the
Higher Education Bill of 1992, which
expands access to college loans, and
the increasing interest in educational
reform recognize the growing economic
value of schooling and its importance
to our national future.
The wage premium received by educated
workers measures the current value their
employers place on education. Thus,
trends in that premium can be understood
by examining shifts in the relative supply
and demand for educated workers. This
Economic Commentary explores possi-
ble sources of the recent patterns of edu-
cation's economic rewards in a market
framework and considers several of its
myriad implications.
• The Economic Return
to Schooling
How do we know that the value of, or
economic return to, education is positive
and has increased? One approach is to ex-
amine over time the median income of
people with different levels of schooling.
In figure 1, we plot these values for
young people in 1980 and 1987. For
both years, inflation-adjusted income
rose with amount of schooling, a strong
indication of education's importance in
the labor market.
To see whether that value has increased,
we compare median income changes of
college-educated people to those of per-
sons with high-school degrees or less. Be-
tween 1980 and 1987, the average annual
income of young high-school dropouts
(workers with 9 to 11 years of education)
fell 15 percent, while the income of
young college graduates rose 7 percent.
Thus, the income gap between college-
and high-school-educated workers was
larger in 1987 than in 1980; schooling
became more valuable.
But what is the long-term pattern, con-
sidering that a college degree represented
the educational dividing line between
income-gainers and income-losers in the
past decade? Figure 2 tracks the ratio of
the median income of college-educated
people to that of high-school graduates
(or the relative wage premium of the
highly educated) from 1967 to 1987. The
ratio fell slightly throughout the 1970s,
but rose sharply after 1980. Other re-
search indicates that the 1980s' phenome-
non of a rising economic return to educa-
tion not only is strong, but pervades all
industries.
The 1980s' phenomenon of a widen-
ing income gap between college grad-
uates and less-educated workers can
be understood by examining market
trends. The recent growth in the finan-
cial benefits of education reflects the fail-
ure of the relative supply of highly
educated workers to keep pace with
increasing demand for their skills. This
need has been fueled by foreign competi-
tion and by technological change that
favors more-skilled workers. Larger
schooling-based wage disparities are
likely to persist or to widen further un-
less educational attainment revives—a
trend that holds profound implications
not only for employers and employees,
but more broadly for our regional and
national prosperity.
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The income disparity between college
and high-school graduates depends on
the relative demand and supply for their
services. Thus, to understand the pattern
of the schooling premium shown in figure
2, we need a corresponding measure of
the "quantity" of educated labor in the
market. Figure 3 tracks such a measure—
the proportion of people with a college de-
gree—from 1967 to 1990. The educational
attainment of young workers first climbed
steadily, then leveled off after 1976.
Because schooling takes time to ac-
quire, only a certain amount of edu-
cated labor is available in the market at
any particular time. But what explains
supply shifts over time, such as those
shown in figure 3? School can be seen
as an investment made by individuals
(or by their parents or community) that
pays off during their working life.
Thus, higher expected benefits from
education, reductions in schooling
costs, or jumps in the number of highly
skilled immigrants all raise the share of
the labor force who have an education.
Using this information on supply and
premiums, figure 4 summarizes the
past two decades of changes in the
value of a college education by plotting
the quantity-premium combinations
for the end-years of the data (1967 and
1987) and around the turning point in
price (1980). This allows us to envision
the supply and demand curves that
determined each point. We draw verti-
cal supply curves (shown as S67, Sgrj.
and Ss7) through each point to reflect
the fact that the relative quantity of
education cannot change quickly.
Next, through each point we draw a
downward-sloping demand curve for
education in labor (shown as Dg7, D80,
and D87). Employers' willingness to
pay more to educated workers is gen-
erally attributed to expected increases
in productivity. Some industries benefit
more than others from an educated
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work force, so employers differ in the
educational composition of their
employees. For any distribution of tech-
nologies, the lower the premium for
educated labor, the higher the average
schooling demanded by employers, as
shown in the negatively sloped demand
curves in figure 4. The demand curve
will shift outward (say, from D67 to Dso,
and then to D87) if technological changes
raise the relative productivity of educated
labor, or if product demand increases for
employers with technologies that benefit
most from educated workers.
Thus, explanations for changes in the
return to education can start by estab-
lishing whether shifts in supply or
demand were responsible. The constant
economic return to schooling from
1967 through 1980 can be explained
by simultaneous growth in the relative
supply and demand for educated labor,
which kept pace with each other. In
contrast, the rising education premium
of the 1980s is consistent with a fixed
relative supply of education, where
employers' growing demand for school-
ing translated directly into income
gains for educated workers.
• Sources of the Increasing Value
of Education
Analysts have offered two leading ex-
planations for the rising demand for
education, and a wider range of ex-
planations for why supply kept pace
during the 1970s only to stall during
the 1980s.
Demand Story I—Skill-biased Tech-
nological Change Recent technologi-
cal advances may favor more-educated
workers. That is, although some innova-
tions increase the productivity (and hence
the wages) of all workers equally, many
others benefit certain groups more than
others. "Skill-biased" changes raise the
efficiency of skilled workers more than
that of unskilled workers. For example,
introducing office phone-mail spares em-
ployees the need to check message boxes
and saves receptionists the time spent
answering calls, but requires the efforts
of a computer specialist for its setup and
maintenance. Thus, this innovation re-
duces the demand for receptionists, raises
the demand for computer specialists (who
are highly skilled), while on average mak-
ing all those employed more productive.FIGURE 2 COLLEGE INCOME PREMIUM
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Even if such biased technological change
lies at the root of the increased demand
for schooling, what is surprising is the
strength, persistence, and pervasiveness
of the bias toward skilled labor. Is there a
single kind of innovation that could
cause the return to schooling to grow dra-
matically for at least 20 years in all sec-
tors of the economy?
The prime candidate for a single source
of skill-biased change is the computer-
ization of the workplace. From 1984 to
1989, the share of businesses using
computers rose from 8 to 36 percent,
while the proportion of workers using
them (predominantly the college-
educated) grew from 25 to 37 percent.
One study of the impact of computer
use on wage levels estimates that be-
tween one- and two-thirds of the in-
creased return to schooling is directly
attributable to this source.
3 Perhaps
workers need education to use computers
effectively, or to endow them with the
flexibility required for the rapid pace of
technical and product change found in
computerized workplaces.
But the influence of automation on the
workplace extends far beyond its direct
impact on computer users. Another
study finds that the ratio of high-tech to
total capital stock in manufacturing has
dramatically increased, from approxi-
mately 1 percent in 1976 to 26 percent
in 1986. High-tech capital includes
computers, instruments, and communi-
cations equipment, whose introduction
would clearly increase the relative de-
mand for highly educated workers.'
The major argument against the skill-
bias explanation is that U.S. productiv-
ity gains actually slowed during the
1970s and 1980s. Could innovations
that so profoundly changed the struc-
ture of labor demand fail to boost over-
all productivity growth? Perhaps the
benefits of the innovations have not yet
been fully realized, or our measure of
productivity somehow misses their im-
pact, or some independent factor has
depressed productivity.Demand Story II—International Trade
The second demand-side theory (which
is not exclusive of the first) notes that
the U.S. labor force has been well edu-
cated compared to the rest of the world
for many years. In the absence of exten-
sive foreign trade, the domestic de-
mand for relatively scarce low-skilled
labor (and its products) supported wage
levels for uneducated workers that were
high by international standards. The
recent advent of lower trade barriers
and the expansion of trade could be ex-
pected to boost export-based demand
for the products created by our edu-
cated labor. Simultaneously, freer trade
would also expand low-cost imports of
the goods made by low-skilled labor
abroad, effectively increasing the com-
petition faced by uneducated labor and
stifling their wages.
Although this explanation is compelling
in both its logic and its consistency
with the facts, most empirical research
has been unable to identify a large ef-
fect of trade on wages. The theory
either may be unimportant, or we may
be unable to detect it at work. The lat-
ter possibility arises because much of
our international trade involves ex-
changing products within the same in-
dustry, while empirical tests are limited
to inter-industry effects, relying on
trade data for broad industry aggre-
gates. Therefore, it is possible that the
effect of international trade on the
wage structure will never be measured
with certainty.
Supply Factors—Costs and Expected
Benefits Why did the expansion of
educational attainment shown in figure 3
stall in the late 1970s? One would expect
that as the financial return to education
began to rise during the 1980s, a greater
number of people would have entered
and eventually graduated from college.
However, other factors, such as rising
real costs, may have influenced the rela-
tive supply of college graduates.
On the cost side, higher education be-
came much more expensive in the past
decade. Expenses (tuition, fees, and
room and board charges) rose by two
times the rate of inflation in public in-
stitutions and by three times inflation
at private institutions. Meanwhile, the
average size of most federal student
grants and loans increased less than the
rate of inflation. Even if costs have not
risen as much as future benefits, higher
costs and lower subsidies mean that
more young high-school graduates may
face borrowing constraints for un-
secured student loans.
On the benefit side, student deferments
from the military draft provided a pow-
erful institutional incentive for college
enrollment that has since been elimi-
nated. Alternatively, potential students
may have been dissuaded from attending
college by the falling financial return to
schooling witnessed during the 1970s
or by uncertainty about the permanence
of the current rewards. If so, attainment
may begin climbing again as news of
the increased financial benefits of a col-
lege degree spreads. Recent hikes in the
percentage of the population entering
and graduating from college may re-
flect such a response.
Finally, the number of low-skilled im-
migrants to the United States surged in
the 1980s. However, the estimated
direct effects of both legal and illegal
immigration on overall educational
levels are fairly small.
Other Explanations Additional theo-
ries, such as the impacts of declining
unionization and internal migration, have
been proposed, but have found only
limited empirical support. Similarly,
some analysts suggest that a decline in
the quality of a high-school education
could have widened the wage gap be-
tween college- and high-school-educated
workers. Leaving aside the question of
whether high schools could have
deteriorated so rapidly and uniformly
across the country, the fact that the return
to education also rose strongly for older
workers argues against this explanation.
• Conclusion and Implications
The weight of current research sug-
gests that increasing financial benefits
from schooling throughout the 1980s
probably stem from steadily rising rela-
tive demand for educated labor, fueled
by skill-biased technological change
and foreign trade.
However, the contrast between the 1970s
(when the value of education fell) and the
1980s (when it rose) stems not from a
previous absence of these powerful
demand trends, but from the failure of the
relative supply of educated workers to
keep pace with increasing demand during
the past decade. Possible explanations for
the stagnant relative supply of labor
during the 1980s include spiraling real
costs of education, cuts in educational
subsidies, the end of Vietnam-era student
draft deferments, and increases in low-
skilled immigration.
These findings have profound social
implications at many levels. Employers
have already faced widening internal
wage structures—a trend that is likely
to persist. In addition, large wage dis-
parities based on schooling mean that
seniority alone will no longer be
enough to move low-wage workers
into more lucrative positions. Rather,
such promotions will hinge on the at-
tainment of new skills, such as through
the use of in-house training or tuition
reimbursement plans. With or without
such programs, employers may find
that market factors will encourage them
to spin off some especially high- or
low-wage jobs to outside contractors,
subsidiaries, or other offices.
Second, these results tell us that the
prosperity of any group, region, or
country will depend on its commitment
to education. National discussions of
test scores and the level and efficacy of
educational subsidies have become
politically charged. On a regional
basis, this means that local income will
increasingly depend on local education
policy. For example, Ohio ranks 43rd
among states in spending on education
as a percentage of gross state product,
is 34th in the percentage of citizens
who graduated from high school (73
percent), and holds 39th place in thepercentage with some college attendance
(17 percent)—all facts that are worrisome
for Ohioans' future earnings. In all areas
of the country, as schooling grows more
valuable, the efficiency and effectiveness
of our educational system must be con-
tinually evaluated and improved in order
to maximize the benefits it bestows.
Finally, for individuals, prosperity will
be more fundamentally tied to their
educational achievements than ever
before. Young people need to under-
stand that most of them will require
more schooling than their parents had,
just to attain the same standard of
living. And, since the quality and ex-
tent of education increasingly deter-
mine a child's fate, equal access to
high-caliber schooling more than ever
before will be the key to true equal op-
portunity, and an essential tool for
breaking the cycle of poverty.
Our findings suggest that the new wage
disparities between the poorly and high-
ly educated are likely to persist or to
widen further unless educational attain-
ment begins to rise again. Ultimately,
the future path of the educational
premium depends on reform of this in-
dustry and on whether the current cap
on schooling attainment is a short-run
phenomenon—easily lifted by spread-
ing the news of the higher rewards of
education—or a long-run constraint.
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3. See Alan B. Krueger, "How Computers
Have Changed the Wage Structure: Evidence
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Bureau of Economic Research, Working
Paper No. 3858, October 1991.
4. See Ernst A. Berndt, Catherine J. Mor-
rison, and Larry S. Rosenblum, "High-tech
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U.S. Manufacturing Industries: An
Exploratory Analysis," National Bureau of
Economic Research, Working Paper No.
4010, March 1992.
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College Graduates," Monthly Labor Review,
vol. 115, no. 7 [July 19921, pp. 3-12). These
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that international trade has increased the wages
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decreasing the wages of high-school graduates
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and Finis Welch, "The Role of International
Trade in Wage Differentials."
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News Release USDL 92-395, June 30, 1992.
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Shelley, "The Future of Jobs for College
Graduates," Monthly Labor Review, vol. 115,
no. 7 (July 1992), pp. 13-21. On the basis of
admittedly speculative projections, Shelley
argues that supply increases may exceed
demand increases in the 1990s.
8. For an analysis of the impact of declining
unionization, see John Bound and George
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in the 1980s: An Evaluation of Alternative
Explanations," American Economic Review,
vol. 82, no. 3 (June 1992), pp. 371-92. The
internal migration hypothesis is refuted in
Erica L. Groshen, "Rising Inequality in a
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Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Working
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